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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STANTON TRANSPORTATION COM-
P ANY, a corporation, Plaintiff, 
CONTINENTAL EMSCO COMPANY, 
a division of YOUNGSTOWN SHEET 
AND TUBE COMPANY, a corpora-
tion, Plaintiff and Respondent. 
vs. 
MARVIN DAVIS, JACK DAVIS, JEAN 
DAVIS, and JOAN PRESTON, part-
ners, doing business under the firm 
name of DAVIS OIL COMPANY, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 
8950 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STANTON TRANSPORTATION CO. , 
(a corporation), 
vs. 
MARVIN DAVIS, et al doing busi-
ness as DAVIS OIL CO. , 
ADDITIONAL AUTHORITIES TO BE IN-
SERTED IN BRIEF a DAVIS OIL COMPANY. 
At the end of the first full paragraph on page 23 add tl 
following authorities aupporting our contention that cha~ 
for transportation of equipment such as a drilling rig are 
lienable: 
Bangor 
In the case of Roofing & Sheet Metal Co. v. Robbins, 
Co., 151 Me. 145, 116 A2d 664, the court held: 
"We regard the item for transportation as in the 
same category as the items above discussed. Lprof11 
overhead, taxes and insurance/ In and of itself, it 
is nonlienable. If materials in place at the construc-
tion site have a greater value because they have bee11 
transported there, the lien will refieot the enhanced 
value of the material. Otherwise, transportation is n1 
a factor to be considered." 
See also 36 Am Jur 62, Mechanics' liens Sec. 76. 
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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STANTON TRANSPORTATION COM-
P ANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
CONTINENTAL EMSCO COMPANY, 
a division of YOUNGSTOWN SHEET 
AND TUBE COMPANY, a corpora-
tion, 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
vs. 
11ARVIN DAVIS, JACK DAVIS, JEAN 
DAVIS, and JOAN PRESTON, part-
ners, doing business under the firm 
name of DAVIS OIL COMPANY, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Case No. 
8950 
The parties will sometimes be designated in this brief as 
follows: Marvin Davis, Jack Davis, Jean Davis and Joan 
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Preston, partners doing business under the name of Davis Oil 
Company, as "Davis"; Continental Emsco Company, a divi-
sion of the Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company, as "Emsco"; 
and Stanton Transportation Company as "Stanton." The 
Walker-Wilson Drilling Company will sometimes be referred 
to as "Walker-Wilson" or as "driller." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This Appeal is from the judgment of the trial court holding 
that Emsco is entitled to a mechanic's lien in the amount of 
$4,158.64, for rock bits rented by the driller (Walker-Wilson) 
through Emsco, as agent, from the manufacturer. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
References to the Clerk's files in this brief are designated 
"R." The transcript of the hearing held September 20, 1957, 
is designated "TRA" and the transcript of the hearing held 
November 5 and 6, 1957, is designated "TRB". 
Davis Oil Company is a partnership consisting of Marvin 
Davis, Jack Davis, Jean Davis and Joan Preston. It is the owner 
of an oil and gas leasehold interest in the following lands: 
The Northeast Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of 
Section 27, Township 41 South, Range 24 East of the 
Salt Lake Meridian. 
On December 19, 1956, Davis entered into a contract with 
Walker-Wilson Drilling Company for the drilling of an oil 
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_,_ 
well on the above-described lands. (TRB pp 22-24, and Plain-
tiffs' Exhibit No. 3 7). 
Walker-Wilson ordered rock bits through Emsco, a supply 
company which, in this instance, operated as an "agent to 
distribute * * * equipment required to drill an oil or gas 
well" (TRA p. 39). The bits were manufactured by Hughes 
Tool Company (TRA p. 43). Emsco, a division of the Youngs-
town Sheet and Tube Company, charged the manufacturer 
of the bits a commission for "handling the billing of the bits 
and the actual receiving of the funds to pay for them" (TRA 
p. 44). 
One of the "Conditions of Sale and Trade Customs" 
printed on the reverse side of Emsco's invoices is the following: 
Rock bits and allied products are never sold but are 
leased. When the original cutter teeth and/ or bearings 
have served their useful life, the user will surrender 
them to the Manufacturer upon request. In accepting 
delivery, the user agrees not to surrender any of the 
tools mentioned above to other than a duly authorized 
representative of the Manufacturer. 
(See Plaintiffs' Exhibits P through Z, and A-1 through A-24; 
and TRA pp. 55-56). A similar statement is printed on order 
blanks of the Hughes Tool Co. (See Plaintiffs' Exhibit C and 
TRAp. 62). 
The rock bits did not become part of the improvement 
or well, and the claim of Emsco is only for the service given 
by the rented bits (TRA pp. 63-64). 
Walker-Wilson did not complete their drilling contract, 
and Davis had to go in and complete the work. Davis suffered 
5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
damages running into several thousands dollars over and above 
the contract price (TRB p. 82). 
STATEMENT OF POINT RELIED ON 
POINT I 
ONE WHO RENTS EQUIPMENT FOR USE IN THE 
DRILLING OF AN OIL WELL IS NOT ENTITLED TO A 
LIEN FOR SUCH CHARGES. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ONE WHO RENTS EQUIPMENT FOR USE IN THE 
DRILLING OF AN OIL WELL IS NOT ENTITLED TO A 
LIEN FOR SUCH CHARGES. 
The total recovered by Continental Emsco Company was 
for the rental of bits obtained by the driller from the Hughes 
Tool Company. Continental Emsco was to collect from the 
driller and pay over to the Tool Company the rents owing 
it for the use of the bits, and for this service Emsco was 
to receive a commission. No bits were sold or otherwise trans-
ferred by the Tool Company or Emsco and upon com-
pletion of their use the bits were returned to the Tool Company 
for future use. 
It is our position here that the language of the pertinent 
Utah Statute, 38-1-3, UCA 1853, to the effect that one is en-
titled to a lien for work done or materials furnished does not 
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include one, who, on behalf of another, rents equipment which 
is returned after its use. 
In Wilkinson v. Pacific Mid-West Oil Co., 152 Kan. 712, 
107 P. 2d 726, wherein a mechanic's lien was sought for the 
rental of certain oil-well casing, the Supreme Court of Kansas 
in affirming the judgment of the trial court, which had sustained 
a demurrer to the petition, stated as follows: 
It is well -s€ttled that the rental or the value of the 
use of machinery cannot be the basis for the claim of a 
mechanic's lien. 
In Road Supply & Metal Co. v. Bechtelheimer, 119 
Kan. 560, 240 P. 846, this court said: 'The rent or 
value of the use of machinery, tools, and equipment 
used in constructing public work is neither labor nor 
material within the meaning of our statutes pertaining 
to mechanics' liens.' Syl. par. 2. See, also, j\llarion 
A1achine Co. v. Allen, 119 Kan. 770, 772, 241 P. 450; 
Given v. Campbell, 127 Kan. 378, 273 P. 442; Fees v. 
Ritchey, 136 Kan. 221, 14 P.2d 652; Bridgeport Ma-
chine Co. v. lvlcKnab, 136 Kan. 781, 18 P.2d 186.'' 
The same court stated in the cited case of Bridgeport 
Machine Co. v. lvlcKnab, 136 Kan. 781, 18 P.2d 186, 188: 
----
We see no reason in deviating from the earlier 
position of this court as to rent for the use of tools. 
It was held in Road Supply & Metal Co. v. Bechtel-
heimer, 119 Kan. 560, 240 P. 846, that rent for the 
use of tools was neither labor nor material within the 
meaning of the mechanic's lien statute. It was held in 
Arkansas Fuel Oil Co. v. McDowell, 119 Okl. 77, 
240 P. 717, that the furnishing of fishing tools in the 
drilling of an oil or gas well on rental contract is 
neither labor nor material within the purview of the 
Oklahoma lien statute.'' 
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See also American Nat. Bank of Hutchinson v. Central Canst. 
Co., 160 Kan. 400, 163 P. 2d 369. 
These cases are in accord with the general view that rental 
charges for equipment used do not fall within the category 
of either "labor" or "materials furnished" as used in general 
mechanics' lien laws. See John H. Black Co. v. Surdam Holding 
Corporation, 250 N.Y.S. 17; Steele & Lebby v. Flynn-Sullivan 
Co., 245 Ky. 772, 54 S.W. 2d 325; Mann v. Schnarr, 228 Ind. 
654, 95 N.E. 2d 138; Willett v. Davis, 30 Wash. 2d 622, 193 
P.2d 321; Sundberg v. Boeing Airplane Co., Wash., 328 P.2d 
692. 
It was also indicated in Clayton v. Bridgeport Mach Co., 
Tex., 33 S.W. 2d 787, that the rental of "tools" used in the 
drilling of an oil well was neither labor nor material, and had 
the Texas statute been limited thereto, as is the Utah statute, 
the court would have denied the lien for such charges. How-
ever, in that the Texas statute also included the term "supplies" 
the court extended the lien to charges for the rental of drilling 
tools as falling within that category. 
We do not believe that any extended argument on this 
point is necessary. The reason and logic of the above cited 
authorities disallowing liens for rental charges on equipment 
used and then returned for future use is clear. The equipment, 
or as in this case, the bits, are not materials consumed within 
any improvement and do not at any time become the property 
of the owner or enhance the value of his property. It is un-
doubtedly true that such rental charges could and should be 
the subject of contractual liability, but this theory should not 
be extended and written into mechanic's lien laws which are 
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to protect those who have expended their product-whether 
it be labor or material. 
CONCLUSION 
We submit that the Utah mechanic's lien statute does not 
grant a lien for the services of rented equipment such as rock 
bits which were used in drilling the well here involved. The 
judgment of the trial court should be reversed. 
Respectfufly submitted, 
ANTHONY F. ZARLENGO 
CLINTON D. VERNON 
Attorneys for Defendants and Appellants 
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